



In 1945, Congress enacted the International Organizations Immunities
Act' (the IOIA), granting certain intergovernmental organizations 2
(IGOs) "the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process
as is enjoyed by foreign governments";3 at that time, foreign governments
were absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of both state and federal
courts in the United States.' Recently, however, Congress passed the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976' (the FSIA), which severely cur-
tailed that immunity6 and thus raised the question whether the FSIA re-
stricted the international immunities conferred by the IOIA. The only
court to address this problem, the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia, has left it unresolved.7
This Note considers both whether the FSIA supersedes the IOIA and
1. 8 U.S.c. § 215, 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f, 26 U.S.C. §§ 892, 3306(c)(16), 3401(a)(5), 4253(c),
7701(a)(18), 42 U.S.C. § 409 (1976).
2. Referred to as international organizations by the 1OA, intergovernmental organizations are
"public international organizations," or "those [organizations] which are composed of governments as
members," H.R. REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1945 U.S. CONG. SERV. 946,
946 [hereinafter cited as 1945 HOUSE REPORT; all page citations are to reprint]. This Note considers
only IGOs meeting the IOIA's requirements for immunity: those in which the United States "partici-
pates" and which the President has designated as "entitled to enjoy" the benefits provided by that Act,
see 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976).
3. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The immunities pertaining to IGOs are known as international
immunities.
4. See 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 948; S. REP. NO. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 SENATE REPORT]; see also infra pp. 1174-1176 (discussing absolute
foreign sovereign immunity before 1945).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(3), 1602-1611 (1976).
6. Under the FSIA, "the immunity of a foreign state is 'restricted' to suits involving a foreign
state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts
(jure gestionis)." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as 1976 HOUSE REPORT]. Commercial acts include, for
example, activities "customarily carried on for profit" and the making of any contract "which might
be made by a private person." Id. at 16. Thus, a state should be immune with regard to actions that
only a state can perform, but not with regard to actions that a private person, as well as a state, could
perform. Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions
Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 212 (1979).
7. See Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1980); accord, Tuck v. Pan Am. Health
Org., 668 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs alleged breach of employment contract by im-
proper discharge and award of inadequate compensation therefor by internal tribunal. Id. at 28-29.
The court held that, on those facts, "[o]n either theory of immunity-absolute or restrictive-an im-
munity exists sufficient to shield the organization from lawsuit. . . ." Id. at 32-33; see also Tuck, 668
F.2d at 550 (similar holding in suit by attorney to employees of organization).
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to what extent IGOs should now enjoy jurisdictional immunity under the
IOIA. It also considers what recourse a plaintiff should have in the event
an IGO defendant is immune.
I. The Effect of the FSIA on the IOIA
Writing for the court in Broadbent v. OAS,' the late Judge Leventhal
first discussed, but found it unnecessary to decide, whether the FSIA re-
stricted the immunities conferred by the IOIA by operation of law.' This
Note attempts to demonstrate that there was no such effect.
A. The IOIA: History and Purpose
Close analysis of the IOIA establishes that granting IGOs "the same"
judicial immunity as that of foreign sovereigns" was intended to confer
independent "immunities of a governmental nature,"'" rather than foreign
sovereign immunity as such.12 The international immunities in question
were completely distinct from foreign sovereign immunities, being
designed specifically to "enabl[e] this country to fulfill its commitments in
connection with its membership in international organizations . .. .""
Before the enactment of the IOIA, American law made no provision for
jurisdictional immunity for either an IGO or its personnel, even though
IGOs were composed of immune foreign or domestic governments."4 Since
the United States did, however, recognize the legal capacity or personality
of IGOs, this lack of immunity meant that the organization, as well as its
personnel, was vulnerable to suit on the same basis as a private party.t5
With the increasing participation of the United States in IGOs after
World War II, this anomaly generated increasing friction. 6 But it was
8. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
9. Id. at 30-33.
10. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1976) (quoted supra p. 1167).
11. 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 946; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
12. Cf Fedder, The Functional Basis of International Privileges and Immunities: A New Concept
in International Law and Organization, 9 AM. U.L. REV. 60, 64 (1960) (IOIA reference to foreign
sovereign immunity "can only be explained as one of convenience").
13. 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 951; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
14. See 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 946-47; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
For a sketch of the pre-1945 history of international immunities in general, see Kunz, Privileges and
Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 828-36 (1947).
15. Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. 'J. INT'L L. 332, 333-34
(1946).
16. See id. This friction was due largely to the Treasury's demands for income and other taxes,
id. at 334, which were resented as a local tax on international officials paid by funds contributed by
foreign states, see id.; Letter from the Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Agency to the Secretary of State, in Sponsorship by the Department of State of Legislation Re-
sulting in the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, [1945] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1557,
1557 (letters to and from Secretary of State re international immunities legislation) [hereinafter cited
as 1OA Letters]. Similarly, the legislative history of the IOIA contains many allusions to tax matters,
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only with the formation of, and United States membership in, the United
Nations that immunities legislation became "essential." 17 Consequently,
the discussion of immunities that then occurred may shed light on the
question of the intended meaning of the IOIA's provisions.
The immunities bill was drafted and sponsored by the State Depart-
ment."8 The Secretary of State had recently 9 submitted to the President a
report20 from the United States delegation to the San Francisco Confer-
ence on the United Nations Charter.2 ' This report concluded that Article
105, the Charter's immunities provision, 22 required the United States as a
member of the United Nations to enact appropriate legislation:23 almost
certainly, the IOIA.2 1 The Act thus may be understood at least partly as
the authoritative interpretation in United States law of Article 105's "nec-
essary" immunities for the United Nations,2 15 applied to IGOs in general.2 6
1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, passim; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, passim, including
letters of consent from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget, 1945 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 951-52. Cf UNITED NATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 104-5, G.A.O.R., 10th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/
2911 (1955) (focusing on need for immunity from domestic taxation).
17. That probability, "and the practical certainty in any case that [the United Nations] would
carry on certain activities in this country, make it essential to adopt this type of legislation promptly.
The committee considers that the passage of this legislation is essential to implement our participation
in this Organization." 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; see generally IOIA Letters, supra
note 16.
18. Letter from Howard K. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to the Secretary of
State, Nov. 6, 1945, reprinted in 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 951; IOIA Letters, supra note
16.
19. June 26, 1945. SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, infra note 20, at 9. The IOIA itself is dated Decem-
ber 29, 1945. 22 U.S.C. § 288. The IOIA Letters, supra note 16, demonstrate sustained effort after
July 2.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2349, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE (1945) [hereinafter cited as SAN FRANCISCO REPORT].
21. The Secretary himself had chaired that delegation. See id. at 28-29 (listing members of and
principal advisors to United States delegation). The eminence of the delegation's members and advi-
sors suggests both the importance of their task and that great weight attached to their conclusions and
opinions.
22. "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1.
23. See SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 160.
24. In addition to the linkage suggested by common authorship and close time sequence, there are
several striking similarities between the language and thinking of the SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, supra
note 20, and the 1945 HOUSE, supra note 2, and SENATE REPORTS, supra note 4: for example, the
references to the need mentioned earlier, see supra p. 1168, to provide for international immunities,
1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 946-47; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; SAN FRAN-
CISCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 158, and the very characterization of those immunities in terms of
those of foreign sovereigns, see supra p. 1168, 14; infra p. 1171.
25. Thus, the IOIA may have been meant to obviate the need for the convention for which Article
105 provides, U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 3. Preuss, supra note 15, at 341-42. If so, it is interesting
that the United States acceded only in 1970 to the General Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the United Nations, adopted by General Assembly Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S.
No. 6900 (entered into force with respect to United States Apr. 29, 1970).
26. According to the legislative reports, each "committee understands that the provisions of the
bill will satisfy in full the requirements of other international organizations conducting activities in
the United States." 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4,
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In addition, the IOIA itself was carefully structured to provide broad
and flexible controls for the immunities it conferred, including Presiden-
tial power unilaterally to modify or revoke them;27 these controls were an
integral and important part of the legislation. 2 Although the 1945 House
Report found that the immunities provisions themselves were "standard in
the light of available precedents,' 29 the Act was to apply only to those
organizations "designated" by the President, not to IGOs generally." The
Act, therefore, may also be understood as Congress' judgment that, apart
from any requirements of the United Nations Charter, the immunities
conferred were those appropriate to particular situations.
Because the IOIA immunities were thus tailored to specific organiza-
tions and situations, they are different from the immunities of foreign gov-
ernments, which are laid down by general international or national law,31
at 3. At least some of these "requirements," and of the United States "commitments" to IGOs to be
satisfied by the IOIA, see supra p. 1168, would be the "[pirovisions ...made with respect to the
problem of privileges and immunities. . .," 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; 1945 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, which remained unsatisfied prior to the enactment of the IOIA, see Letter
from the Director General of UNRRA, supra note 16.
On this reading, the IOIA immunities would represent Congress' 1945 judgment that the "require-
ments" of other IGOs could be assimilated to those of the United Nations; the Act would then provide
the immunities "necessary for the fulfillment of [the] purposes of" IGOs, U.N. CHARTER art. 105,
para. I (quoted supra note 22); cf infra p. 1181 (discussing theory of international immunities).
Given the IOIA's emphasis on the United Nations, see supra p. 1169, such a reading seems at least
plausible.
27. See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976) (President authorized, first, in light of functions performed by
IGO, to withhold, withdraw, condition, or limit enjoyment of immunities provided for; second, to
revoke immunity of IGO if, in his judgment, immunity abused, or for any other reason).
28. See 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 948 ("Section [2881 .. .is a basic provision to
which the committee has given careful study. The committee believes that the interests of the United
States are adequately protected by the restrictions which have been created.").
After the House Committee had considered the bill, the Justice Department, fearing that foreign
nationals attached to the United Nations might commit espionage or disseminate hostile propaganda,
proposed that the Executive be granted authority precisely to tailor the immunities conferred, see
Letter from Attorney General Clark to Secretary of State Acheson, Oct. 2, 1945, in IOIA Letters,
supra note 16, at 1563; the State Department revised the bill accordingly, see Letter from the Secre-
tary of State to the Attorney General, Oct. 4, 1945, in id. at 1567. These revisions were specifically
approved by the Senate Committee. 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3. This concern for the
protection of United States interests, displayed throughout the consideration of the IOIA, suggests that
Congress in fact intended to confer no greater immunity than was judged strictly necessary. Cf Letter
from the Acting Secretary of State to the Attorney General, July 2, 1945, reprinted in IOIA Letters,
supra note 16, at 1560 (bill grants "less extensive privileges than ... are accorded in various other
countries" even before Senate amendments).
29. 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. Con-
gress thus judged that the IOIA immunities were necessary to meet IGO requirements, either because
other nations had also found such immunities necessary or because the United States could not confer
narrower immunities without violating internationally accepted standards.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976); cf supra note 26 (drafters of IOIA had in mind specific IGOs and
particular obligations).
31. Foreign sovereign immunities arise under international law, as modified by national law, see
infra 1172-73 (discussing foreign sovereign immunity theory), whereas international immunities were




and are grounded on considerations such as reciprocity 32 that do not apply
to IGOs. 3 Moreover, both the IOA's legislative history and the San
Francisco Report distinguish the immunities under consideration from
those of foreign sovereigns. 34 The structure and provisions of the IOIA
also imply such a distinction.5
The lOIA's use of the word "same, ' 36 then, was intended to refer to,
rather than to incorporate, established foreign sovereign immunity law.37
32. Reciprocity is the notion that if State A does P to or for State B, B will do P to or for A; or
that A will only do P if B agrees to reciprocate; or that A need not do P to or for B if A has no
interest in whether B reciprocates. The IOIA excludes direct reciprocity considerations from IGO
immunities. 22 U.S.C. § 288f (1976).
One author argues backwards from the FSIA that "this provision of the IOIA indicates that subse-
quent changes in United States law concerning foreign sovereign immunity were intended to have no
bearing on the immunities granted by the IOIA." Note, Sovereign Immunity and International Orga-
nizations, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 675, 691 (1979). Because this argument seems to require, first,
Congressional foreknowledge that those subsequent changes would be based on reciprocity considera-
tions and, second, the counterfactual supposition that the changes actually were based entirely on such
considerations, such a conclusion appears unwarranted.
33. Both committee reports explain that § 288f was intended
to make it clear that the privileges and immunities may be extended to international organiza-
tions even though such organizations are not in a position to accord similar treatment to the
United States; in substance the effect is to state that the reciprocity provisions which are con-
tained in certain laws providing for privileges and immunities to foreign governments would
not be applicable in this situation.
1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 950; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. Because reci-
procity may be applied to foreign state nationals who are affiliated with IGOs, 22 U.S.C. § 288f
(1976), IGOs may incidentally be subject to reciprocity tactics aimed at their member states. Another
example of the applicability of such indirect reciprocity is the comment of both legislative committees
that
[t]he self-interest of this Government in legislation of this character is twofold since such legis-
lation will not only protect the official character of public international organizations located in
this country but it will also tend to strengthen the position of international organizations of
which the United States is a member when they are located or carry on activities in other
countries.
1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
34. See SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 159; see also 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note
2, at 948-50 (immunities of IGO personnel said different in scope from immunities of foreign diplo-
mats); 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-6 (same). If the personnel associated with an IGO
are to be treated differently from the personnel associated with a foreign sovereign, an IGO and a
foreign sovereign cannot possess precisely the "same" immunity. Cf supra note 33 (discussing inap-
plicability of reciprocity considerations of foreign sovereign immunity).
Moreover, the "privileges to which international organizations and their officials will be entitled are
somewhat more limited than those which are extended ... to foreign governments." 1945 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 950-51; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; see also SAN FRANCISCO
REPORT, supra note 20, at 158 (diplomatic immunities described as settled and long-established, in
contrast to emerging international immunities). This is not inconsistent, of course, with the commit-
tees' statements that the immunities bill puts IGOs "on the same basis as foreign governments" in
many respects, 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 948; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4,
and that "the privileges and immunities provided . . .are similar to those granted . . . to foreign
governments and their officials," 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 950; 1945 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 3.
35. Section 288d(b) describes the immunities of international personnel without linking those im-
munities to those of foreign states or of diplomatic representatives. Cl. supra note 34 (necessary impli-
cation of limitation on "sameness" of states and organizations).
36. Supra note 3."
37. But see O'Toole, Sovereign Immunity Redivivus: Suits Against International Organizations, 4
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International immunities in general were only intended to be "of a gov-
ernmental character";38 and jurisdictional immunity was merely to be
"similar to"39 that of a foreign state, that is, absolute."
B. The FSIA: History and Purpose4
The FSIA, on the other hand, "deals solely with sovereign immunity"
in a commercial setting.42 The Act had two major objectives: to "codify the
so-called 'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity,' and "to transfer
the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch." 4 This Note argues that the Act was not intended to af-
fect international immunities.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon41 is still the starting point for any discussion of the United
States law of foreign sovereign immunity. He used the principles of com-
ity, extraterritoriality, and reciprocity 46 to imply the consent of a sovereign
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 11-12 (1980) (Congress' overriding intent to treat IGOs and foreign
sovereigns identically; adjusting scope of IOIA immunity to match FSIA necessary to achieve that
intent). Professor O'Toole inquires little, however, into the 1OIA's history. Cf infra note 40 (that
history refutes his assertion that IOIA does not define scope of immunity).
38. 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see
supra p. 1168.
39. See 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 950; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
40. See supra p. 1167. The IOIA's legislative history, then, defines the IOIA provisions, contrary
to the supposition that the "Act. . .did not directly provide a definition of the scope of the immunity
now to be extended to international organizations," O'Toole, supra note 37, at 7.
The IOIA thus should be read as prescribing "the same [absolute] immunity from suit and every
form of judicial process as is [now] enjoyed by foreign governments," c. supra p. 1167 (quoting 22
U.S.C. § 288a(b)), in order clearly to state the intention of Congress. Professor O'Toole disagrees,
arguing "that if Congress intended to ossify the immunities of international organizations it could
easily have so declared by adding the words 'as of the date of this Act' to [§ 288a(6)]." O'Toole, supra
note 37, at 11. Given, however, applicable principles of statutory construction, see infra pp. 1177-78,
Congress had no need to do so to achieve such a purpose.
41. For an excellent analysis of the FSIA, see Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1976); von Mehren, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); and sources
cited therein.
42. 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (contrasting sovereign with diplomatic immunity). The Act
was not "intended to affect either diplomatic or consular immunity," id. at 12, which are the immuni-
ties attached to the representatives and embassies of foreign sovereigns and thus are concerned only
with foreign states as such. The FSIA focuses, therefore, on only one aspect of foreign sovereign
immunity: it is narrowly and "specifically addressed to foreign state defendants" acting commercially,
id. at 7.
43. Id. at 7. For a definition of that principle, see supra note 6; infra p. 1173.
44. 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. Congress feared that, because of diplomatic pressures, the
State Department would not apply the restrictive theory in actual litigation, id., creating "considerable
uncertainty" in that a "private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be certain
that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations
through the foreign government's intercession with the Department of State," id. at 9. That fear grew
out of experience: the State Department often had been influenced by such considerations. Infra p.
1175.
45. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
46. The law of foreign sovereign immunity is based on these three principles. See, e.g., R. BLOCH
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to a waiver of jurisdiction47 over another sovereign amicably present
within its boundaries. For well over a hundred years this holding was
read to require complete immunity for foreign sovereigns from the juris-
diction of all courts" of the United States.49
But as sovereigns generally came to be regarded as subject to rather
than above the law, 0 and as states increasingly engaged in ordinary
trade,"1 that absolute immunity came under attack 2 and the principles
sustaining it were eroded."3 In spite of some incipient wavering,54 the Su-
& J. LEFEVRE, LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE ET EUROPEENE 42 (1963); von Mehren,
supra note 41, at 35 & n.9. Comity is the general practice of nations, see, e.g., 11 U.S. at 137;
extraterritoriality deems certain persons or property physically located within a nation to be outside
that nation's territory, see, e.g., id. at 136, 137; and reciprocity relies on the probability that actions
will be reciprocated, see, e.g., id. at 136; see also supra note 32 (defining reciprocity). The "mutual
benefit," or reciprocity, argument that Marshall employed, like the functional necessity of interna-
tional immunities, see infra p. 1181; cf supra pp. 1169-70 (IOIA provides only necessary immuni-
ties), is the pragmatic justification for sovereign immunity. As such, it has come to be the dominant
justification, see D. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 25 (1971), replacing
the more normative principle of extraterritoriality or sovereign dignity that was determinative in the
nineteenth century, see, e.g., 11 U.S. at 137.
47. See 11 U.S. 136, 143 (implication of consent); id. at 146 (sovereign may destroy implication);
id. at 137 (waiver).
48. Although The Schooner Exchange was a federal case, see 11 U.S. at 117, so that the United
States alone was the sovereign consenting to immunity, the state courts as well have perceived them-
selves to be bound by its pronouncements. See, e.g., Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of
Venez., 420 Pa. 134, 146-47, 215 A.2d 864, 869-77, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); seegenerally
Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 322, 329-30 & n.4 (1969).
49. Not required by The Schooner Exchange, which provided only for rather narrow immunities,
see 11 U.S. at 137, 138, 139, 145-46, this reading was adopted as a matter of policy by the Supreme
Court. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1926).
50.
[Tihe growing opposition to the jurisdictional immunities of foreign states has drawn its
strength from factors aris[ing] to a large extent from the challenge to the prerogatives of the
sovereign state which denies to the individual legal remedies for the vindication of his rights as
against the state in the matter both of contract and of tort, and which asserts a privileged
position for the state in the procedural sphere. That challenge has been largely successful in
most states under the rule of law.
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
220, 220 (1951).
51. At present, governmental commercial activities account for approximately 30% of all interna-
tional trading. W. REISMAN & M. McDOUGAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE (1981).
52. Courts and commentators have focused on the simple unfairness of states' claiming sovereign
rights when acting like private persons. See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, [19771 1 All E.R. 881, 891-92 (Denning, L.J.); Kuhn, The Extension of Sovereign Immu-
nity to Government-Owned Commercial Operations, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 772, 774-75 (1945). In such
situations, a foreign sovereign may in effect be collecting an extraterritorial tax, since its trading
activities may well be furthered by its exercise of its power-including its immunity-as a sovereign.
Chief Justice Marshall himself held that sovereigns need not always be treated as sovereigns. See,
e.g., The Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907-
08 (1824); The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145 (dictum).
53. The fiction of extraterritoriality, which "asserts a privileged position for the state in the proce-
dural sphere," Lauterpacht, supra note 50, at 220, was vulnerable on grounds of fairness, see supra
note 52, and of irrationality: few reasons for governmental immunity can exist when a government
chooses to operate as a private trader subject to commercial conditions rather than to exercise the
authority peculiar to sovereigns. The extraterritoriality theory can be said largely to have been re-
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preme Court nevertheless continued to hold to the absolute theory.5 But
just before enactment of the IOIA, Ex parte Republic of Peru6 and Re-
public of Mexico v. Hoffman57 authoritatively transferred primary re-
sponsibility for determining immunity in particular cases and for formu-
lating policies for making those determinations to the State Department."
Because, in the absence of a specific suggestion from the State Depart-
ment, courts were still to apply the absolute theory as being the estab-
lished policy of that Department, 9 and because Ex parte Peru and Hoff-
placed, as in domestic jurisdictional law, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), by a criterion of (fundamental) fairness. See, e.g., 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7; Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y
Gen., May 19, 1952, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]; infra
notes 62, 73.
In addition, the principles of comity and reciprocity both favored a change in practice as the behav-
ior of other countries changed. See, e.g., the Tate Letter, supra, at 985 (justifying such change in
United States practice partly by finding "little support" around world "for continued full acceptance
of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity," and that "long established policy" of United States of
not claiming immunity in certain areas "most inconsistent" with "granting of sovereign immunity to
foreign governments").
54. Compare Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1937) (libelled vessel, allegedly
owned and in possession of Spain, held, in absence of State Department recognition of immunity, not
immune as not having been shown to be in possession and public service of Spain) with Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (merchant ship owned and operated by foreign govern-
ment held immune in spite of State Department's stated policy that merchant ships not entitled to
immunity).
55. Von Mehren, supra note 41, at 41.
56. 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (holding courts bound by State Department's express "recognition and
allowance" of claim of immunity).
57. 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (holding vessel owned by but not in possession of Mexico not immune
because State Department had accepted only claim of ownership, had indicated that immunity proba-
bly not available, and had never allowed claim of immunity on ground of mere title).
58. See Ex pane Peru, 318 U.S. at 586-87; see also, e.g., 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
This practice of looking in each case to the Executive Branch for guidance had long been develop-
ing. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1881); 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; cf.
infra p. 1193 (courts reluctant to deal with foreign affairs). It was generally approved, see, e.g.,
Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 614-
15 (1954), at least to the extent of inquiring whether the defendant was in fact a recognized sovereign,
see, e.g., Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168,
168-69 (1946)-and, under the absolute theory then prevailing, the answer to that question would
normally be determinative.
In contrast, Hoffman's enshrinement of the Executive's policies, see infra note 59, gave the political
branch jurisdiction over questions of law, Jessup, supra, at 169; c. infra note 61 (discussing political
character of immunity law). Such an increased reliance on Executive decisions may also be reflected in
the IOIA's provisions for Executive control of IGOs. See supra p. 1170.
59. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34-35, 36. That decision bound the courts to the policies of the
State Department. The State Department, however, had made its only statement of policy in that case
by citing two court rulings, see id. at 31-32, and had in fact attempted earlier to adopt a restrictive
theory, only to be overruled by the Court, see, e.g., Cardozo, supra note 58, at 609; c. supra note 54
(Court granted immunity in Steamship Pesaro against State Department policy). "The freedom of a
foreign sovereign from being hauled into court as a defendant has . . . become part of the fabric of
our law . . . solely through adjudications of this Court." National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).
Since both Exparte Peru and Hoffman were decided in the context of war, and both relied on Lee,
see 318 U.S. at 588; 324 U.S. at 35, which in turn rested on the thesis that immunity decisions "might
involve war or peace," 106 U.S. at 209, it is likely that the Court turned to the Executive for resolu-
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man rested on a political question rationale," those decisions effectively
denied the applicability of law to dealings with foreign sovereigns."1
The State Department's adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity
in 195262 provided parties with some minimal legal standards,6' but the
Department remained susceptible to political pressures.6 Also, it did not
provide criteria for applying the test of immunity adopted, 6 thereby lead-
ing to uncertainty and inconsistency when the courts, following Hoff-
man,66 endeavored to apply the new policy. As was to be expected with
tion of a question perceived as capable of leading to war.
60. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; see also supra notes 58, 59.
61. "[O]ne reading the opinion of Chief Justice Stone in the Hoffman case might well assume
that this is a subject with regard to which no body of law exists, a subject governed entirely by
political considerations." Jessup, supra note 58, at 168. As Justice Powell put it, "[tlo so argue is to
assume that there is no such thing as international law but only international political disputes that
can be resolved only by the exercise of power." First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (concurring in plurality decision). The effect of this deference to the Execu-
tive was, thus, to stymie the trend toward subjecting sovereigns to the rule of law. See supra p. 1173.
62. This theory was officially adopted in 1952. See the Tate Letter, supra note 53. Mr. Tate
argued from comity (international usage), id. at 984-85, reciprocity (United States no longer asserted
immunity in foreign or its own courts), id. at 985, and fairness (modern equivalent of extraterritorial-
ity, see supra note 53), id.
63. One commentator suggested that "the Department . . . will have to establish . . . quasi-
judicial procedures" to ensure "that plaintiff will be given that essential ingredient of due process, his
day in court." Cardozo, supra note 58, at 617-618. Such procedures were in fact instituted. Contem-
porary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 631, 650-52
(1970); Weber, supra note 41, at 59 n.38. Under these procedures, foreign states initiated determina-
tions of immunity, Weber, supra note 41, at 59 n.37; see Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, supra, at 651, thus having the option of court or State Department
determination, 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8, which the states used to choose the more favorable
forum, e.g., Weber, supra note 41, at 1-2, 11-13 (for example, see id. at 1-2).
64. 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9; Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:
Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 548-49 (1977); see, e.g., Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1966) (State Department suggested immunity for foreign
state defendant even though suit based on commercial activities); Chemical Natural Resources v. Re-
public of Venez., 420 Pa. 134, 160-61, 215 A.2d 864, 876-77, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966)
(same); see also supra p. 1172 (FSIA transferred determinations of immunity to judiciary because of
fears of foreign state influence on State Department).
65. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); von Mehren, supra note 41, at 41. How
to distinguish between commercial and governmental activities had already been found an almost
impossibly difficult question in the domestic sovereignty arena. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622, 644 n.26 (1980) (dictum); O'Toole, supra note 37, at 10; cf. New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (referring to "such untenable criteria as
'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the States") (dictum).
66. The case could be, and was, interpreted in various ways. Compare, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at
34-35, 36 (majority opinion) (courts to follow policies of State Department) and id. at 38-42 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (case turns on foreign sovereign's lack of possession of vessel; courts should not
disclaim jurisdiction otherwise belonging to them except when State Department or Congress "explic-
itly asserts that the proper conduct of [foreign] relations calls for judicial abstention," id. at 42) with
Cardozo, supra note 58, at 616 (Court seemingly inconsistent in permitting courts to decide immunity
questions when no recognition by State Department while forbidding courts to recognize immunity on
new grounds not recognized by government) and Sanborn, The Immunity of Government-Owned
Merchant Vessels, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 794, 794 (1945) (majority of Court held no immunity because
vessel not in possession of foreign sovereign).
67. See, e.g., Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
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the Department continuing to retain primary jurisdiction,"8 the courts' ef-
forts resulted in no definitive solution.6 9 Moreover, the United States con-
tinued to adhere to an absolute theory of immunity from execution."0 The
FSIA was intended to deal with this specific and highly unsatisfactory
situation,71 which was peculiar to the law of foreign sovereign immunity.
72
Analysis of the Act's history and provisions confirms that Congress did
not consider international immunities." In fact, the only mention of the
IOIA or international immunities in the FSIA or in its official legislative
history protects those immunities against possible infringement under the
FSIA,74 indicating, in conjunction with Congress' careful limitation of the
scope of the 1976 Act whenever it might affect closely related areas of
law,75 that the legislature perceived the two Acts as capable of overlapping
only at that point. Moreover, the FSIA's stated goal of depoliticizing im-
munities 6 is incompatible with the broad powers given the Executive in
F.2d 354, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1964) (suggesting that "the distinction is unworkable"), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).
68. One probable reason for the FSIA's transfer of jurisdiction back to the courts was to allow
them to develop such criteria. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13, 16.
69. See id. at 7 (no "firm standards as to when a foreign state may validly assert the defense of
sovereign immunity").
70. Von Mehren, supra note 41, at 42-43 & nn.42-44.
71. 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-8, 12; see also supra p. 1172 (stating objectives of FSIA).
72. International immunities were almost invariably determined, with only two partial exceptions,
solely under the IOIA and were deemed absolute. See Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 868 n.42
(6th Cir. 1978); Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.); Edison Sault Electric Co. v. United States, 552 F.2d 326, 336 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Soucheray v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 483 F. Supp. 352, 355 (W.D. Wis.
1979); Weidner v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org'n, 392 A.2d 508, 510-11 (D.C.
App. 1978) (complaint filed after FSIA went into effect; court did not mention FSIA but cited District
Court opinion in Broadbent, 481 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1978)); Gregoire v. Gregoire, 127 N.Y.L.J.
810, 810 (1952). Only two fairly early New York state cases rested even partly on a State Depart-
ment recognition. See Wencak v. United Nations, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1956, at 6 col. 7, 23 I.L.R. 509
(1956); Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afl'd without op'n, 88
N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 1949).
73. In all the extensive hearings, reports, and scholarly analysis of this Act-it was introduced
twice, see 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-10, and the commentary is quite voluminous-the ques-
tion of its possible impact on the immunity of IGOs apparently was not once directly raised. Cf. supra
note 42 (FSIA's focus quite narrow). Moreover, the Act rested exclusively on the foreign sovereign
immunities principles of reciprocity, see 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, fairness, see id. at 6-7, and
comity, see id. at 9, with no mention of the necessity principle of international immunities, see infra p.
1181.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1976); 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31. "The reference to 'inter-
national organizations' in this subsection is not intended to restrict any immunity accorded to such
international organizations under any other law or international agreement." Id. at 31 (emphasis
added). Congress also noted that attachments of funds of foreign sovereigns held by IGOs "would also
violate the immunities accorded to such international institutions" under the IOIA, 1976 REPORT,
supra note 6, at 30, implying that those immunities would automatically survive the passage, and
hence that the IOIA was independent, of the FSIA.
75. See supra note 42; see also 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, passim (numerous references to for-
eign states as objects of that legislation).
76. See supra p. 1172.
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the IOIA." One may safely conclude, then, that Congress, apparently
considering the IOIA to be independent of the FSIA, 8 expressed no clear
affirmative intention to modify the 1945 Act merely by passing the 1976
legislation.
C. The IOIA and the FSIA: The Law of Statutory Construction
The question remains whether rules of statutory construction operate to
incorporate the FSIA into the IOIA. This Note concludes that they do
not.
Under general principles of statutory construction, a statute incorporat-
ing the general law on a subject also incorporates subsequent changes in
that law, whereas a reference to a body of general law in a statute dealing
with a specific separate issue has no such effect." The IOIA's removal of
the reciprocity considerations"0 that are the hallmark of foreign sovereign
as contrasted with international immunities" indicates, in conjunction
with the arguments made earlier,12 that the IOIA is a reference statute.83
Such a characterization accords, moreover, with Congress' evident purpose
of conferring a specific assortment of privileges and immunities on quali-
fying IGOs."
The FSIA's reference to the IOIA is limited to one subsection; 5 thus,
the statements in the committee report denying that Congress intended to
affect international immunities 6 do not necessarily sever the remainder of
the two Acts. 7 United States v. Gue Lim8 lays down the most closely
applicable canon of statutory construction: the courts may not lightly pre-
sume Congress' intention unilaterally to alter an international obligation,
but must rely on clear indications of a deliberate intent so to act. 9 This
77. See supra p. 1170 (such powers important part of IOIA).
78. This interpretation of the FSIA corroborates the earlier reading of the IOIA as providing
independently for absolute jurisdictional immunity for IGOs. See supra p. 1172.
79. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.07-.08 (C. Sands
4th ed. 1972); see also In re Heath, 144 U.S. 92, 93-94 (1892); Sentell, "Reference Statutes"--Borrow
Now and Pay Later?, 10 GA. L. REV. 153, 155-56 (1975).
80. 22 U.S.C. § 288f (1976).
81. "[W]hereas observance of diplomatic privileges and immunities is ensured through the opera-
tion of the principle of reciprocity, an international organization has no such effective sanction." D.
BOWETF, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 308 (1975); see also supra pp. 1170-71 (reci-
procity not applicable to IGOs); pp. 1175-76 (analyses of foreign sovereign immunity consider reci-
procity rather than functional necessity).
82. Supra pp. 1169-71.
83. See also Brief for Appellees 51, Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980). If the
IOIA incorporated any law, it was that of international immunities. See id. at 44-45; supra p. 1170.
84. See supra pp. 1169-70.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1976); see supra p. 1176.
86. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31; supra p. 1176.
87. But see supra note 74 (Congress believed IOIA independent of FSIA); c. supra pp. 1172,
1176 (FSIA not affirmatively intended to affect IOTA).
88. 176 U.S. 459 (1900).
89. See id. at 465; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1933). The principle is not
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suggests that clearer language than that supplied by the FSIA90 is re-
quired to alter by operation of law alone the terms of the commitment
represented by the IOIA.91
The argument for modification of the IOIA by the FSIA rests largely
on simply reading the terms of the FSIA into the words of the IOIA.92 It
urges only secondarily that application of the FSIA would not so interfere
with the functioning of IGOs as to violate any provision for "necessary"
immunities,93 and that absolute immunity is in itself undesirable.9 4 Conse-
quently, the foregoing analysis vitiates that argument by showing that
such a conjoint reading is hard to justify.
That conclusion is further supported by the history of judicial treatment
of the IOIA as separate from sovereign immunity law.9 Between the pub-
lication of the Tate Letter in 195296 and the passage of the FSIA in 1976,
many cases analyzed the immunity of a defendant IGO in terms of the
provisions of the IOIA rather than by applying the commercial/govern-
mental distinction of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 7 Nor
did IGOs normally request determinations of immunity from the State
Department," although such a practice was routine among foreign sover-
eign defendants-and the Department, in considering one of the few
such requests, cited the IOIA in support of its determination of
immunity.100
This separate treatment for nearly a quarter century suggests that in-
ternational and foreign sovereign immunities were considered mutually
directly on point, for Gue Lim deals with a negotiated and ratified treaty commitment, not with
unilateral legislation. In itself, the IOIA is neither a treaty nor an expression of binding international
law, although it probably was intended to satisfy various treaty commitments or minimum interna-
tional standards, supra pp. 1169-70. The Schooner Exchange, however, required that such commit-
ments be renounced "in a manner not to be misunderstood." 11 U.S. at 146. See also The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law .. ")
90. That language has been shown to support more easily an inference of intent not to modify the
IOIA. See supra pp. 1176-77.
91. Similarly, in construing two sections of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court refused, for
two reasons applicable here, to use the bare language of one to restrict the other. See United States v.
Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 278 (1965) (no indication in language or legislative history of first section of
intention to affect construction or application of second; in enacting second section, Congress con-
sidered first, evidencing "no awareness of interrelationship or inconsistency").
92. See Brief for Appellants at 4, 5, 10, Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-10, id.; O'Toole, supra note 37, at 11-12.
93. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 92, at 8-9; Brief for United States, supra note 92, at 8-
10; O'Toole, supra note 37, at 15-16.
94. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 92, at 9; O'Toole, supra note 37, at 10-11.
95. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 48-50.
96. Supra pp. 1173-74.
97. See supra p. 1176.
98. There were, apparently, only two exceptions. See id.
99. Weber, supra note 41, at 11-12.
100. Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1947), a)fd without op'n, 88
N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 1949).
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independent by the courts as well as by the Executive and by Congress.
This Note consequently concludes that, as a matter of law, the passage of
the FSIA has had no effect on the IOIA.
II. A Proposal for Restricted Immunity under the IOIA
The above analysis, however, demonstrates only that the law does not
require modification of the IOIA by the FSIA. It does not consider the
policy of restricted immunity: that, in general, IGOs may have no need of
an absolute immunity that in itself is undesirable.'"' Although the FSIA
should not be read directly into the IOIA,°2 this Note argues that
Broadbent v. OAS' 03 provides a jurisprudential basis for restricting IOIA
immunities 04 along the lines laid out by the FSIA:' 5 under the IOIA,
IGOs should be vulnerable to suit for money damages'0 ' when not en-
gaged in "core" activities.' 7
101. The grant of immunity confers a privileged status, see supra p. 1173; infra p. 1181, which
subverts the principle that legal rights entail legal responsibility, see infra pp. 1181-82, and allows the
immune person to harm others with impunity, see infra pp. 1182, 1186.
102. The FSIA defines "commercial activity" in terms of the nature rather than the purpose of
the activity, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976); the legislative history looks to, for example, "a . . .contract
...of the same character as a contract which might be made by a private person," 1976 REPORT,
supra note 6, at 16. Such a test, by distinguishing between, for example, a developmental loan by the
Inter-American Development Bank, Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382
F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1967), and the Canadian-United States International Joint Commission's pre-
vention of flooding on the upper Great Lakes, e.g., Edison Sault Electric Co. v. United States, 552
F.2d 326 (Ct. Cl. 1977), discriminates arbitrarily and unacceptably against IGOs engaged in certain
types of activity that, although public in purpose, could be performed by private persons.
Moreover, the FSIA does not forbid injunctive relief, which could be obtained in practice by attach-
ing non-immune assets under § 1610 and requiring compliance with the injunction as a condition for
their release. Such a practice would be unacceptable as directly interfering with the independence of
the IGO. Infra p. 1179.
103. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Leventhal, J.).
104. This Note does not consider the status of any particular IGO under any particular agree-
ment. Thus, agreements conferring only "necessary" immunities, e.g., O.A.S. CHARTER art. 103, Apr.
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, as amended, art. 139, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6849, would be affected by this redefinition.
This analysis would not affect other, more specific agreements, such as the General Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 25, art. 2, § 2, which would also
escape the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). In addition, the Executive Branch would remain free
both to tailor immunities unilaterally under the IOIA, see supra p. 1170, and to negotiate more
precise agreements with IGOs. Finally, the IOIA's provisions for IGO immunity from taxation, 26
U.S.C. §§ 892, 3306(c)(16), 3401(a)(5), 4253(c), 7701(a)(18) (1976), which were at the heart of IGO
demands for immunity, see supra p. 1168, would survive unaltered.
105. See id. at 33-35. Judge Leventhal, treating the OAS as a government without a country, see
infra note 173, read the FSIA to provide immunity for IGOs that was effectively analogous, not to the
Act's restrictions, but to the immunity left by the Act to foreign sovereigns. Cf infra pp. 1187-1190
(adapting FSIA to accommodate IGOs).
106. Because injunctions by their nature interfere (or have the appearance and capability of inter-
fering) with the organization's conduct of its public affairs, even restricted immunity should allow
only money damages, not injunctive relief. See O'Toole, supra note 37, at 10-11; infra pp. 1181, 1182
(IGOs' need to be independent of national control).
107. These are activities engaged in to perform functions specified in an IGO's charter or estab-
lished by consistent practice. Accordingly, they may be deemed "central to the nature of the organiza-
1179
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 1167, 1982
The IOIA itself demonstrates that Congress could simply say "im-
mune" when it wanted to confer absolute immunity; ' thus, section
288a(b)'s more elaborate formula provides some evidence that the jurisdic-
tional immunities of IGOs and of foreign states are somehow linked.' 9
The legislative history10 and the IOIA's provisions for Executive modifi-
cation"' provide evidence that Congress intended the IOIA immunities to
be adaptable. In addition, the reasons underlying the FSIA's transfer of
immunity determinations to the judiciary" 2 apply to the IOA," indicat-
ing that the courts may exercise their normal power to interpret statutes
in order to examine what section 288a(b) is to mean today."4 Moreover,
the IOIA arguably incorporates international law "' and, hence, changes
in that law under principles of statutory construction"' and of interna-
tional law."7 Municipal (that is, national) courts have the duty to shape
as well as to apply international law;'" thus, when Congress does not act,
the courts may.1 9
tion and involv[ingl the conduct which it was created to conduct in order to achieve its international
purposes," O'Toole, supra note 37, at 13, and directly "necessary for the fulfillment of [its] purposes,"
U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1 (quoted supra note 22). Cf infra p. 1187 (viewing such immunity as
governmental).
108. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a(c) (1976).
109. Cf supra pp. 1171-1172 (arguing similarity to as opposed to identity with foreign sovereign
immunity).
110. The Senate in fact commented that engaging in commercial activities would constitute
grounds for revoking the immunity of an IGO. 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also id.
at 1-2; 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 946, 948.
111. See supra p. 1170.
112. Immunity is a legal matter that the State Department may not properly decide; the Depart-
ment may be influenced by extralegal considerations; and Department decisions provide no general
criteria for determining immunity. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9; supra p. 1172, 1175.
113. The United States in fact filed an amicus brief in Broadbent urging judicial adoption of a
restricted IGO immunity subject to determination by the courts. See Brief for United States, supra
note 92, at 7, 8-10. The Justice Department almost certainly consulted the State Department before
taking such a position. O'Toole, supra note 37, at 14-15.
114. The argument made earlier, supra pp. 1176-1178, was against the direct incorporation of the
FSIA into the IOIA, supra p. 1179. The FSIA may well affect the IOIA indirectly. See infra 1187-
1190 177-98 (developing theory of restricted immunity on that basis).
115. See supra p. 1177.
116. See supra p. 1177.
117. Under international law, "[tihe same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to
the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its
continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law." The Island of
Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S. v. Netherlands), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arbitration Awards 829, 1932 Hague
Ct. Rep. 2d 83 (1928) (Huber, Arb.), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 883 (1928). That award
held that intervening changes in the law vitiated a title valid under earlier law. 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at
883-84. This doctrine is known as the intertemporal principle.
118. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1899); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 860-61 (2d Cir.), afi'g 193 F. Supp. 375, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
119. Cf Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881, 889,
891-92 (Denning, L.J.) (because English law incorporates, hence changes with, international law,
Court of Appeals need wait neither for House of Lords nor for Parliament to speak in order to
restrict common-law rule of absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns).
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A. The Law of International Immunity
Since the Seventy-ninth Congress gave no reasons1 20 for its decision to
confer absolute but modifiable immunity on IGOs, but did refer to the
practice of other nations, 121 international legal analysis 122 may supply a
rationale for the granting of the special privilege of immunity.23 IGOs
possess whatever immunities may be "necessary for the fulfillment of
[their] purposes '' 24 and for their independence from national control, 25 as
international theory and practice agree.2 6 This is known as the "func-
tional necessity" test of international immunities.2 7 In the period after
World War II, when international cooperation on a large scale was just
beginning, 28 the consensus was that functional necessity entailed jurisdic-
tional immunity.2 That judgment rested on a conception of IGOs as
young and vulnerable fledglings that, not being mature organizations,
could not survive, much less function, without special protection. 30
120. There is no specific discussion of the jurisdictional immunity provision. See 1945 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 2; 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4. The SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, supra note
20, supplied the reasons presented earlier, supra pp. 1169-1170.
121. Supra p. 1170.
122. See generally C. JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES (1961); Lalive, L'Immunite de
Juridiction des Etats et des Organisations Internationales, 84 RECUEIL DES COURS 205 (1953).
123. Cf supra p. 1173 (immunity as asserting "a privileged position ... in the procedural
sphere").
124. U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1 (quoted supra note 22). The IOIA may well incorporate
this standard. Supra p. 1169-1170.
125. E.g., SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 159 ("The United Nations, being an organ-
ization of all the member states, is dearly not subject to the jurisdiction or control of any one of
them."); C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 18 ("International immunities are the legal device through
which international action escapes national control . . . ."). The IOIA probably incorporates this
principle too via the SAN FRANCISCO REPORT, see supra p. 1169-1170, or international law, see supra
p. 1170; infra p. 1182.
126. E.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 17; Fedder, supra note 12, at 62-64, 69. No scholar
appears to contradict this principle. Some say that no rule of law exists, that IGOs possess only the
immunities specified in their constitutive agreements; but even they immediately go on to refer to
functional immunity as important in international practice. See D. BOWETT, supra note 81, at 310; I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (3d ed. 1979). And international prac-
tice appears to be based on functional necessity. See PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL OR-
GANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS (1961).
127. E.g., A. BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 281-82 (1977); D. MICHAELS, supra
note 46, at 149-50.
128. See, e.g., E. LUARD, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES vii (1977).
129. E.g., Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 26-29; see, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 17,
41 (IGOs need protection against: control or interference by any one government; any one country's
levying charges on international funds; prejudice or bad faith of national courts; baseless or malicious
suits; conflicting legal requirements; national determination of law applicable to international organi-
zation); McKinnon Wood, Legal Relations between Individuals and a World Organization of States,
30 GROTIUS SOC., TRANSACTIONS 141, 143-44 (1945) (same).
130. Multinational corporations were never immune; and the immunity of foreign sovereigns in
commercial matters has been diminishing steadily since the 1920's, supra pp. 1173-1174. Such entities
are able to earn profits while enduring all the disadvantages of subjection to local jurisdiction; nor are
IGOs in any case exempt from obedience to general provisions of law, see, e.g., K. AHLUWALIA, THE
LEGAL STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NA.
TIONS AND CERTAIN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 203 (1964); Seyersted, Applicable Law
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Theorists acknowledged that legal rights, and a fortiori legal immunity,
imposed legal responsibility;"' but some held that the principle of interna-
tionality1 32 required international rather than national adjudication.,
Such a requirement would, however, operate in practice to prohibit the
adjudication of most cases. The International Court of Justice has only
advisory jurisdiction over IGOs'34 and is not designed to try their ordinary
disputes with individuals. The internal tribunals established by many or-
ganizations 3 ' have only limited jurisdiction,'3 6 present the appearance of
the denial of justice, 3 ' and have been accused of succumbing to bias in
practice. '38 Waivers, arbitration agreements, and similar measures are un-
satisfactory: whether they are granted is entirely within the discretion of
the organization;' 3' nor are they available in ordinary tort cases. And rely-
ing on the state of the injured person to negotiate on his behalf interposes,
as an additional barrier to any recovery, the discretion of a government
that already has been found unacceptably heedless of individual injuries.
and Competent Courts in Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations and Private Persons,
122 RECUEIL DES COURS 427, 462-63, 545 (1967, III). The problem, then, was the perceived weak-
ness of IGOs; their inability to choose profitable areas in which to conduct their prescribed functions
argues only for immunity restricted to those functions.
131. E.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 41; Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of
Responsibility, 76 RECUEIL DES COURS 323, 385 (1950); Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 37-38.
132. That is, the freedom of the IGO from national control. Although this concept has a norma-
tive component, see, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 18; Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 38, it
is fundamentally a corollary of functional necessity, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at xxxviii, 17, 26;
see also supra note 46 (pragmatic rather than normative considerations now determinative), since
other governments would be reluctant to participate in an IGO controlled by one country.
Thus, this principle argues for immunity only to the extent required by practical necessity, which
may be determined by analyzing the needs and possible responses of the IGO and its members. This
task is within the capability of a national judiciary. See infra pp. 1184, 1185; see also infra p. 1184
(task assigned to judiciary by legislative and executive branches).
133. E.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 18, 26.
134. See I.C.J. STAT. arts. 34, 65. Although Eagleton describes a complicated maneuver whereby
disputants may arrange to obtain binding judgments from the ICJ, Eagleton, supra note 131, at 418-
20, the need for such legal sophistication makes the suggested relief inadequate for many if not most
plaintiffs.
135. The OAS itself, for example, has such a tribunal. Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 8-9.
The practice is fairly common. M. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 4-5 (1967).
136. They usually are designed to deal with internal matters only. See Brief for Appellees, supra
note 83, at 54.
137. See, e.g., Fasla v. Secretary-General of the UN, 54 I.L.R. 351, 373, 381 (1979) (plaintiff
claimed loss of job through supervisors' gross negligence in evaluating his performance; although tri-
bunal found for him on merits, it three times refused to order reinstatement instead of severance pay);
M. v. Organisation des Nations Unies, 45 I.L.R. 446 (1972) (UN admitted its troops had looted and
burned plaintiff's property, but refused to award more than 100,000 francs in "reparation" for
claimed loss of 3,799,675 francs).
138. See O'Toole, supra note 37, at 4, 14 n.39.
139. Although the organization may exercise this power with restraint, see, e.g., Preuss, Immu-
nity of Officers and Employees of the United Nations for Official Acts: The Ranallo Case, 41 AM J.
INT'L L. 555, 557-58, 577-78 (1947), the possession of such power is itself undesirable. Cf K. LLEW-
ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362 (1960) ("massive and almost terrifying jug-handled char-
acter" of form contracts).
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This unavailability of international remedies urges that municipal courts,
already charged with shaping international law, should not be forbidden
to try suits against IGOs on the ground of their international status
alone.4 0
The question, then, is whether IGOs now need the protection of an
immunity available to no other entity; whether their situation is so
changed that the law ought to change as well.' At present there is no
consensus that absolute jurisdictional immunity is necessary.14 2
B. Considerations Governing International Immunity
Three identifiable groups are directly interested in the jurisdictional po-
sition of IGOs: the organizations themselves; the parties with whom they
interact; and the nations in whose territory they operate. IGOs are indis-
pensable in a world in which problems and potentials extend beyond indi-
vidual nations. 1 3 Accordingly, the law must endeavor not to impede their
intended operations 4 4 and, as a corollary, must protect their independence
in both appearance and reality from the control of any one nation.145 The
parties dealing with IGOs'46 are, here, considered to be private individual
or corporate persons; they may be taken to act primarily for themselves,
although they may incidentally benefit or seek to benefit others. The na-
tions concerned, powerful compared to either IGOs or private persons
standing alone,147 seek to regulate those activities of both IGOs and pri-
vate persons that those governments feel affect their interests.
The interests of these three parties must be taken into account to devise
a rule that is both politically workable4M and legally acceptable. 149 The
140. See Seyersted, supra note 130, at 435; c. Eagleton, supra note 131, at 395-98 (possibility of
plaintiff's national state not knowing whom to sue if justice denied only reason given for foreclosing
local jurisdiction); supra note 132 (if internationality not required as normative matter, national
courts capable of necessary practical calculations).
141. See C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 45, 151-52; P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 150-
52 (1948); cf supra p. 1180 (IOIA as incorporating changes in international law).
142. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 618.
143. A. BENNETr, supra note 127, at 16-17; E. LUARD, supra note 128, at vii-ix, 2-5; see D.
BOWETT, supra note 81, at 308.
144. See supra p. 1181.
145. See supra pp. 1181, 1182.
146. These parties include the recipients of IGO-conferred benefits and foreign sovereigns engag-
ing in activities that are commercial under the FSIA.
147. E.g., E. LUARD, supra note 128, at 288; see supra p. 1177. In any case, there is little an IGO
can do to discipline a contributing as opposed to a recipient state; and the United States is a large
contributor. See The Intergovernmental Organizations Related to the United Nations, 31 Y.B. U.N.
1067-1175, U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.79.1.1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Intergovernmental Organi-
zations]; infra pp. 1184-85.
148. The rule adopted should operate in practice to facilitate international intercourse. MeDougal
& Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 1 (1981). Thus, it should be politically acceptable, so as to encourage compliance rather than
evasion. This is especially necessary in international law, which lacks an authoritative institutional
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problem of balancing these interests may be simplified, however, by mak-
ing use of two bodies of governmental immunity law: foreign and domestic
sovereign immunity in United States law.5
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
There is less justification for absolute international than for absolute
foreign sovereign immunity. Reciprocity considerations, extended to in-
clude retaliation of any type,"' were crucial in deciding that the Executive
Branch had jurisdiction over immunity decisions." 2 Yet the Executive it-
self has found that most cases, even against foreign sovereigns, do not in-
volve such essentially political matters as to require decision by nonlegal
processes'53 that afford little protection to private persons against unneces-
sary subordination of their interests to those of the governing body.5 4 In
enacting the FSIA, which authoritatively transfers jurisdiction over immu-
nity decisions to the courts, Congress has agreed with this judgment.
In addition, an IGO has relatively little scope for adverse responses to
actions taken by the United States: it can cease or restrict operations in
enforcement mechanism.
149. The rule of absolute jurisdictional immunity for IGOs was, at bottom, a political concession
to the member nations to ensure the viability of IGOs. See supra p. 1181. The private persons whose
interests were most directly affected and were abrogated had no voice in the decision. Such a proce-
dure is repugnant to the judicial process. It is desirable, then, to reconsider, in the light of present
conditions, the necessity for this grant of immunity. See Note, International Organizations: Immu-
nity-Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 552, 560-61 (1980) (urg-
ing such re-examination); Note, International Organizations-Immunity-Personnel Decisions of an
International Organization are not "Commerdial Activities" and Thus May Not Form the Basis for
an Action Against the Organization, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 913, 922-23 (1980) (same). Because Congress
itself suggested that absolute jurisdictional immunity could be modified, such an inquiry is not imper-
missible. Supra pp. 1179-80.
150. Domestic law analogies may assist in formulating rules of domestic law, d. Lauterpacht,
supra note 50, at 237 (linking foreign and domestic sovereign immunity), within the limits of interna-
tional law, see supra p. 1177 (domestic law must conform to international law if at all possible). Cf
Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 1165-67 (1954) (im-
munity for foreign government should be put on approximately same basis as that of domestic
government).
151. If reciprocity is defined narrowly, as involving the same type of behavior-for example,
grants of immunity-by both parties, courts may feel themselves competent to decide cases, as with
The Schooner Exchange. But if reciprocity is defined broadly to include responses of any type, includ-
ing retaliatory actions of a wide variety, courts may perceive the question as political and hence the
responsibility of the Executive. See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); cf.
Note, Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court: Using the Certiorari Process to Avoid Decision-
making, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 903 (1976) (Court hoping for legislative action on complex immunity
question). See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (in deciding justiciability, courts
to analyze foreign relations question "in terms of the history of its management by the political
branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action").
152. Supra p. 1174.
153. See supra p. 1172.
154. See supra pp. 1172, 1175. Nor should diplomats, whose constituency is the nation as a
whole, be expected carefully to protect the rights of individuals.
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the United States, attempt to expel the United States, or protest through
diplomatic channels, including those within the organization. Since the
first two measures are quite drastic, it is unlikely that IGOs will take such
actions unless severely provoked;55 and diplomatic channels remain
open. '5 IGOs are, however, more vulnerable to United States actions than
are foreign governments;'57 consequently, the law ought to protect IGOs
from overly intrusive or burdensome intervention caused by the legal
processes of the United States.
Moreover, since IGOs are vehicles for cooperation rather than competi-
tion with the United States and its citizens, there is less reason to fear
judicial bias against an IGO defendant, 58 and correspondingly less reason
for IGOs or their member governments to feel that judicial decisions un-
duly favor the United States. Finally, since the law to be enforced is either
local or international," 9 not foreign, judges should be able to apply famil-
iar standards in adjudicating cases. 60 Comparing international with for-
eign sovereign immunity law thus argues against the retention of absolute
international immunity, but for the provision of politically necessary
immunities.
2. Domestic Sovereign Immunity
Less justification also exists for absolute international than for absolute
domestic sovereign immunity. That the United States government cannot
be sued without its consent in federal courts is probably due to its being
the government from which those courts derive their powers. 1' This
155. See also supra note 147 (little IGO can do against United States, which is large contributor).
156. Such channels of course include the complicated pressures an IGO's members can bring to
bear within the organization itself, as well as more formal avenues of protest.
157. Not only do IGOs depend to a great extent on United States financial support, see supra
note 147, they are vulnerable to lobbying and other persuasive efforts by persons within the organiza-
tion, see also supra note 156. Foreign sovereigns are vulnerable in neither of these ways.
158. Judges, of course, guard against bias in any case. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 307 F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The fact of
cooperation does, however, make the task of guarding easier; that Sabbatino itself, which set aside as
discriminatory an action of the government of Communist Cuba against United States banks, was
reversed by the Supreme Court as having erroneously asserted United States jurisdiction over a for-
eign country, 376 U.S. at 398, suggests that the judicial guard may sometimes drop.
159. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, supra note 83, at 37-38; Seyersted, supra note 130, at 435.
160. In deciding cases involving foreign nations, different normative systems and expectations
must be taken into account. See, e.g., Deutsch, Law, Capitalism, and the Future, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
309, 342-44 (1976). In domestic law, on the other hand, judges are free to enforce the norms of a
single, reasonably coherent community, which both restrains a "nonjudicial" exercise of discretion and
provides the 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards" necessary for justiciability, Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
161. E.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) ("in cases of actions against the
United States, there is no power which the courts can call to their aid"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at
602 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1871) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."). This is probably the source of the pro-
nouncement, carried to this country from England, that "The King can do no wrong," which has
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clearly is not true of IGOs; '6 and in any case domestic sovereign immu-
nity has gradually been surrendered to a great extent."3
Moreover, because an IGO, which is composed of foreign states and
largely staffed by international civil servants, owes no loyalty to its host
nation,"' it may present a threat to that nation's securityt61 and even to its
ability to govern its own citizens.166 Accordingly, a host nation needs to be
able to set enforceable limits to the sphere of the IGO's activity."7 But the
IGO is also relatively powerless and thus needs some protection against
undue interference"6  by such a nation, even though it is acting with
rather than against that nation.'" Thus, comparison with domestic immu-
nity also argues against absolute immunity, but for immunity on suitable
terms, that is, as narrow as allowed by functional necessity. it 0
often been considered the rationale for sovereign immunity even in the United States, see, e.g., Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980).
By constitutional amendment, states are immune from suit in federal courts. U.S. CONST. amend.
XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Conversely, the federal government is immune on federal-
ism grounds from suit in state courts. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907) (alternative
holding).
162. The United States government is, of course, one of the members of any IGO. See supra p.
1167. Nonetheless, the IGO does not possess the sovereignty of the United States over United States
courts; moreover, it derives its immunity from the express mandate of the United States government,
not via common law from the immunity of its member governments, supra p. 1168; see also supra p.
1170.
163. See, e.g., the Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.);
the Federal Tort Claims Act, tit. IV, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842, as amended (codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.); the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1976); the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976).
164. E.g., D. MICHAELS, supra note 46, at 28; see, e.g., the IOIA Letters, supra note 16, at 1563.
165. See, e.g., supra p. 1170.
166. Cf, e.g., Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (because employed by UN,
defendant United States citizen held not in contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions of
House Committee on Un-American Activities).
167. This has been achieved with respect to IGO employees by holding that, because certain
activities cannot be deemed to fall within the scope of their official functions, the employees are subject
to, for example, criminal prosecution for espionage. United States v. Egorov, 222 F. Supp. 106
(E.D.N.Y. 1963); United States cx rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
United States v. Melekh, 193 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. I1. 1961); United States v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp.
472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
168. See supra pp. 1182, 1183. Because each IGO has a financial situation and an assortment of
internal constituencies, composed of its member states and its beneficiaries, that are peculiar to it, the
issue of what constitutes "undue" interference may well be decided differently in different cases. For
this reason, the Executive may find it desirable to specify particular immunities to fit the situation of
an individual IGO. Cf supra p. 1179 (President would retain power to tailor IOIA immunity under
restrictive theory).
169. Ct supra p. 1185 (cooperation as reducing potential judicial bias). Domestic governments
themselves need some protection against their own citizens. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-
07 (1978); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950).
170. E.g., D. BOWETT, supra note 81, at 308; O'Toole, supra note 37, at 3 & n.9. Such an
emphasis on restricting immunity accords with the trend against immunity, see supra p. 1173, as well
as with the primacy of law, see supra notes 61, 149.
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C. A Proposal for Restricted Jurisdictional Immunity
The question, then, is how to prescribe in legal terms the immunity
that IGOs in general require as a matter of practical necessity. In the
absence of actual IGO vulnerability, 7 ' this problem may be resolved by
examining the organizations' needs in the light of their intended functions.
1. The Public/Private Distinction
Because they perform specified public services under authority granted
and controlled by sovereign states, IGOs probably may best be treated as
agencies of a hypothetical world government, 172 the approach implicitly
adopted by Judge Leventhal in Broadbent.1 13 Several considerations 174
then suggest that IGOs should be absolutely immune when acting as gov-
ernment agencies,"' that is, when directly engaged in their "constitutive"
or "ccore" activities.
1 7 6
Such a formulation of restricted immunity nicely balances the compet-
ing interests of the various groups. The independence and operations of
IGOs as IGOs are protected; to the extent that the organization acts as a
private person, other private persons and the host nation may assert their
legal rights against it on that basis. This assertion of only sovereign im-
munity is, then, the essence of the functional principle of immunity.
2. Adapting the FSIA
Since immunity as government is also the heart of the FSIA commer-
171. IGOs with miniscule budgets probably would suffer material injury if not absolutely im-
mune, see, e.g., The Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 147; c supra note 168 (each IGO's
situation different), and ought to retain that immunity. Courts should determine the actual need for
immunity on a case-by-case basis, using only public or freely volunteered records to avoid a burden-
some inquiry merely to determine whether jurisdiction exists.
172. Such an analogy is not wholly accurate; for example, no actual world government exists.
Nevertheless, the relation of IGOs to their constituent states is sufficiently similar to that of the fed-
eral to the state governments to provide an illuminating analogy. See, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122,
at 17-18.
173. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 34-35.
174. Chief among these is the need to avoid national control and to prevent any outside direction
of their activities. See supra p. 1181.
175. See, e.g., FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605 (1976) (foreign sovereigns immune except when
acting in various non-governmental capacities); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J.) (immunity may apply to activities "uniquely capable of being [carried on] only by a
State . . . ."); Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (immunity should extend to "strictly political or public acts"); d. supra
p. 1186 (UN personnel not immune from prosecution for espionage because such activity not within
scope of their official duties).
176. O'Toole, supra note 37, at 13; supra p. 1179. This meets the requirements of the writers on
this subject, see supra p. 1181, who apparently did not contemplate that IGOs would engage in
commercial activities. Cf, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 122, at 151-52 (restricted immunity might be-
come appropriate in that event); 1945 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (engaging in such activity
one ground for withdrawing IGO's immunity).
1187
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 1167, 1982
cial/governmental distinction, 77 and since the IOIA itself indicates that
foreign sovereign immunity is relevant to international immunities,' the
specific provisions of the former statute are authority for a means of trans-
lating a principle of core function immunity into rules of law.'79 Judge
Leventhal's apparent distortion of the language of the 1976 Report""0 in
defining restricted IGO immunity thus turns out to be proper procedure:
rather than read the legislative history literally, he allowed the OAS to
deal with personnel subject to it""' without interference from United States
courts,' an ability retained by foreign sovereigns under the FSIA."'
Such an interpretation of the FSIA provides specifically for jurisdic-
tional immunity for matters relating to (international) civil service em-
ployees-and, by extension, an IGO's internal administration"'8-and for
the equivalent of "foreign assistance program[s],"'"' that is, the constitu-
tive functions,'86 of the IGO. The latter activities are of an inherently
noncommercial nature: like national public assistance, they directly benefit
the entities the organization was created to help, not the IGO itself."'
177. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 14, 16-17.
178. See supra pp. 1171-72, 1179-80.
179. The law of domestic sovereign immunity attempted to apply a similar distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions. See supra note 65. Unfortunately, that law is too unclear to
provide much guidance here. Id.
180. The judge construed the 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16, to exclude its specific language
that employment of United States citizens was a commercial activity. He justified this reading by
finding that provision "not applicable to international organizations" because, unlike foreign sover-
eigns, they possess no citizens of their own through whom "to conduct 'governmental' matters." 625
F.2d at 34. While his logic underscores the FSIA's lack of consideration of international immunities,
supra p. 1176, it scarcely compels the conclusion that, if the FSIA is incorporated into the IOIA,
Congress' explicit language protecting United States citizens, 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16,
counts for nothing.
181. IGO employees must be treated as internationals even when they are United States citizens.
D. MICHAELS, supra note 46, at 28; see also M. AKEHURST, supra note 135, at 5-6; supra note 166.
182. 628 F.2d at 34. The underlying principle is that one state may not interfere in matters
wholly within the jurisdiction of another government. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408, 410
(1930); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11, 312-13 (1981).
183. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. See id. Such immunity is unanimously recommended.
See, e.g., Brief for United States, supra note 92, at 11-18; d. O'Toole, supra note 37, at 10-11 (urging
restriction of immunity but acknowledging injunctive relief should not be available to employee plain-
tiffs). It also appears necessary in order to protect the IGO from pressures exerted through its em-
ployees. Cf Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (needs of employees affect
IGO's conduct of its affairs).
184. Seyersted, supra note 130, at 435; cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
414, 428-37 (1964) (United States courts have no jurisdiction over governmental actions "fully exe-
cuted within the foreign state").
185. 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
186. See also supra pp. 1179, 1187 (defining constitutive functions and suggesting immunity for
such activities as governmental); supra p. 1187 (finding such immunity functionally necessary). Such a
definition looks to the nature rather than the purpose of the act, as required by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d); see also 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
187. The contributions of the members are made to further such purposes; they should not, and
may not if the organization is to be politically viable, cf. supra note 132 (other countries reluctant to
participate in IGO controlled by one state), be diverted into other payments benefiting one state con-
trary to the intention of the other states, cf supra note 129 (that possibility one reason for absolute
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Immunity for these activities also stems from the potential plaintiff's prob-
able expectation that the IGO itself ultimately controls such matters.1t8
When, however, the transaction involves a private person seeking an
ordinary commercial profit, the FSIA classifies it as commercial in na-
ture.'8 9 The gist of the Act is that a transaction otherwise commercial does
not become public merely because made by a government for a public
purpose;' 90 such transactions, although they may be necessary for core ac-
tivities to proceed, directly benefit the IGO."'9 Thus, a substantially rou-
tine contract for the construction of an office building, 92 the shipment of
relief foodstuffs,' 93 or the purchase of medical supplies to be distributed
for public purposes would all subject the IGO to the jurisdiction of United
States courts. 94 Moreover, the private contractor involved probably views
the transaction as commercial;'95 if the organization does not wish to ac-
jurisdictional immunity). This is one of the chief reasons for exempting IGOs from national taxation,
see, e.g., 13 Di(;*" OF INTERNATIONAi. LAW 100-02 (M. Whiteman ed. 1968), which in turn was one
of the chief purposes of the IOIA itself, see supra p. 1168.
188. Thus, a loan made by an IGO in fulfillment of its public purposes would be immune, see
supra p. 1179; cf 1976 REPI'OR', supra note 6, at 16 ("mere participation in a foreign assistance
program ... is an activity whose essential nature is public or governmental"), whereas a loan made
by a commercial bank, which seeks to earn profits and by definition has private purposes, see supra p.
1183, would not, 1976 RHIORT, supra note 6, at 10. Similarly, under the civil-law principle of admin-
istrative contracts, which are contracts of so public a nature that the parties must be deemed to have
contemplated that the governmental party not be wholly bound by the contract's terms, a contract with
a public purpose will not be enforced against a sovereign. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v.
Libyan Arab Rep. (1977) (Dupuy, Arb.), reprinted in 17 INT'i. LE(;AL MAT. 1 (1978).
189. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7, 9, 10, 14, 16-17. Thus, an IGO attempting to earn a
commercial profit, even from core activities, should not be immune: it would have entered into compe-
tition with private persons. Cf supra note 52 (foreign sovereign not immune when acting as private
person).
190. 1976 Rh'PORTI, supra note 6, at 16. Even if IGOs do not seek to achieve political ends by
trading, they are availing themselves of the benefits provided by the marketplace and laws of the host
nation, and hence should be subject to its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
191. No unacceptable intrusion would result even in the case of a contract for materials necessary
to the conduct of the IGO's core activities. The IGO is, in this respect, acting in no purely govern-
mental capacity since it is the primary beneficiary of the transaction. Cf. supra p. 1183 (private
parties act for own benefit). There is no reason to presume an IGO less capable than any other entity
of fending for itself in commercial matters, but see supra p. 1186 (vulnerable IGOs should retain
immunity), or to impose knowledge of a secondary public purpose on a private person entering into
what seems a routine supply contract, ce supra note 188 (administrative contracts those private per-
sons would expect to be public in nature).
Moreover, the IGO retains control over the subject matter of the contract until it is actually deliv-
ered to the recipient. Since IGOs are acknowledged to be subject to law, which in turn holds them
responsible to the other contracting party, and since the IGO has chosen to enter into this agreement,
there seems little reason to foreclose judicial jurisdiction. See supra pp. 1181-82.
192. Cf Dumont & Besson v. Association de la Muette, 47 I.L.R. 345 (1974) (contractors build-
ing IGO offices sued for noise; court found it had jurisdiction).
193. CE International Refugee Org. v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951) (IGO
suing for breach of contract for shipment of food). Restricted immunity would give a shipper a corre-
sponding right to sue, for example, for nonpayment.
194. See generally 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
195. In such cases, the FSIA suggests that a foreign sovereign will forfeit an otherwise available
immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976) (so providing with regard to maritime liens); 1976 R.-
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cept his view, it may explicitly contract to alter the normal procedures of
law.196 That such a transaction should not give rise to immunity thus gives
effect to the expectations of the party with less reason to suspect his disad-
vantage and hence less ability to bargain for a contract to his liking.Y7
The FSIA's logic applies even more forcefully to ordinary tort plain-
tiffs, who are unable to bargain in advance for waiver of immunity and
who have entered into no profitable agreement under which they might
have waived their normal right to sue for injury. Merely allowing suit in
tort against an IGO seems unlikely to constitute overly intrusive interfer-
ence with its core activities.' And the need to protect private persons
against nonconsensual, tortious injury appears strong enough to justify
what interference might occur.
But the plaintiff in a governmental tort action,"9 say for deliberate mis-
use of the IGO's fundamental powers, is in a different situation. Since the
organization would normally be immune from such suits even under re-
stricted immunity law, the question is whether such an allegation of mis-
conduct should be deemed to remove the action involved so far from the
sphere of governmental behavior as to confer jurisdiction."' 0 Allegations of
intentional or negligent abuse of power are easily made and, in contrast to
contract and ordinary tort pleas, hard to resolve by motion for summary
judgment: 0 ' because jurisdiction itself could not be found without a deci-
sion on the merits of the case, almost all such suits would have to be tried.
The threat of trial before a jury and judge loyal to the host nation02 for
PORT, supra note 6, at 21-22 (same); cf supra notes 188, 191 (private person's expectations factor in
immunity determinations).
196. Clauses effectively providing for immunity are not illegal, even when benefiting private per-
sons, if bargained for by parties of relatively equal strength. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 812 (1972) (sustaining confession-of-judgment clause).
197. An initial position of nonimmunity would leave both parties in relatively equal bargaining
positions. Cf. supra p. 1182 (immunity allows one-sided contracts).
198. Insurance is readily available; and the UN itself has routinely waived immunity in such
cases for over twenty years, see Ehrenfeld, United Nations Immunity Distinguished from Sovereign
Immunity, 52 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 88, 90 (1958).
199. Such actions involve abuse of governmental power rather than private misconduct. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
200. This question is distinct from whether the officials themselves may be sued for such miscon-
duct. The IGO may be thought legally incapable of acting in violation of its charter or of applicable
law, so that the only possible defendants would be the officials involved. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159-60 (1908) (use of name of state official to enforce unconstitutional act held conduct without
authority of and not affecting state in governmental capacity). The conduct of its agents is, however,
the responsibility of the IGO; their use of its power may have caused the injury complained of; the
IGO having control of the evidence, discovery of the proper individuals may be difficult; and its assets
may be more plentiful and more readily available. Thus, in the absence of other considerations, the
IGO, as well as its agents, should be a proper defendant in such a suit.
201. Allegations of intent normally present genuine issues of material fact, 6 J. MOORE & J.
LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.17[41.-1] (2d ed. 1980), which may not be resolved by
summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
202. Such a jury might well be biased against the non-national IGO. The possibility of bias
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what might well be significant damages °3 would give a plaintiff too much
leverage to coerce the organization to act in his favor, would chill the
organization in its performance of its essential functions, and would pre-
sent a plausible appearance of attempted domination of the organization
by the host nation. Such a rule would, as well, open the door to, direct
intervention in the core activities of an IGO."4 The functional necessity
rule, then, mandates denial of relief even to genuinely and severely injured
plaintiffs."' 5
3. Application and Effect
The outline above provides for immunity only for the IGO's constitu-
tionally prescribed governmental activities,0 6 including transactions such
as loans that would be private if made for profit. Ordinary business con-
tracts directly benefiting the IGO itself, even when executed to make gov-
ernmental activities possible, and ordinary torts carry with them ordinary
liability to suit. Victims of governmental torts, however, have no legal
remedy. The fundamental test is whether suit would so interfere with the
organization's performance of its intended functions as to hamper its inde-
pendent operation." 7
Under this theory of restricted international immunity, Broadbent,208
Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization,"9 and Weidner v. Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization,2 ° all involving suits by
former employees, correctly asserted the immunity of the defendant IGO.
Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank2"
was also correct in holding the defendant IGO immune from a suit related
against residents even of sister states is largely responsible for the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts, U.S. CONST. art. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), and for the provision that an out-of-state defen-
dant sued in a state court may remove the trial to a federal court having original jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). E.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (Story,
J.).
203. Damages might be measured by, for example, the amount of a grant to a third party plus
incidental or consequential damages, see, e.g., Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev.
Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967); and punitive damages might be available in tort actions,
204. For example, an IGO's fear of paying damages for governmental activities might cause it so
to restrict those activities as to have an effect similar to enjoining those activities; such a fear could,
consequently, interfere with the core activities of IGOs. See supra p. 1179.
205. Cf Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.) (principle of domes-
tic government independence requires toleration of some evil), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
206. See supra pp. 1179, 1187, 1188.
207. In cases not covered by the specific rules given above, the burden of proof of vulnerability
should rest on the IGO. The organization should, however, be able to rely solely on public or freely
volunteered records in meeting that burden. See supra p. 1186.
208. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
209. 668 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This case appears to concern an attorney for the employees
of an IGO.
210. 392 A.2d 508 (Ct. App. D.C. 1978).
211. 382 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.).
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to a loan made in pursuance of its core activities; and the International
Joint Commission cases"' rightly held that body immune from actions for
flood damage caused by its regulation of the water level of the Great
Lakes, a constitutive function. On the other hand, Menon v. WeiF" and
Means v. Means,"" which forbade actions against the United Nations for
garnishment of employees' wages for the support of their estranged wives
and children' probably were incorrectly decided; if the employee himself is
not immune," 5 the organization's operations probably would not be unac-
ceptably compromised by turning over part of his salary to a third party
in satisfaction of a judgment obtained against him. 21 , Even the plaintiff in
M v. Organisation des Nations Unies, 2 7 a suit growing out of the United
Nation's peacekeeping activities in the former Belgian Congo, probably
should have obtained a trial, since the United Nations had admitted liabil-
ity but had not formally determined damages. 218
The proposed restricted immunity, then, goes far toward affording re-
lief to injured private persons while preserving the ability of intergovern-
mental organizations to operate independently and effectively to fulfill
their purposes. It also preserves both the language and intent of the IOIA
and the FSIA while meeting the requirements of international law.
III. Relief Against Immune IGOs
The above theory of restricted immunity leaves remediless three signifi-
cant groups of plaintiffs: IGO employees; participants in governmental
activities; and victims of governmental torts. By hypothesis these plaintiffs
are United States subjects219 or base their suits on actions occurring within
212. Souchecray v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 483 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Wis.
1979); Edison Sault Electric Co. v. United States, 552 F.2d 326 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
213. 320 N.Y.S.2d 405, 66 Misc. 2d 114 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
214. 60 Misc. 2d 538 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969).
215. If not immune, he is necessarily acting outside the scope of his official duties, see, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 105, para. 2, and the IGO's core activities could not be involved.
216. Congress prohibited the garnishment of funds owned by a foreign sovereign but held by an
IGO. See supra note 74. Such funds, however, are likely to be used for, and to be necessary to the
achievement of, core functions; whereas paying the wages of an employee, here only a private person,
see supra note 215, is merely an administrative matter that can create no additional liability. More-
over, any judgment obtained would be against the employee in his private capacity, and would not
affect the IGO's ability to direct or control him.
217. 45 I.L.R. 446 (1972) (summarized supra p. 1182).
218. Unlike Broadbent and Weidner, this was no internal administrative matter; at issue were the
rights of someone with no ties to the UN. Cf supra pp. 1188-90 (IGO has jurisdiction over internal
matters; tort, even more than contract, plaintiffs, should have opportunity for legal relief). But al-
lowing suits for such large amounts might well impede the public operations of the United Nations,
see Ehrenfeld, supra note 198, at 91-92; supra pp. 1190-91, and probably would tend to repress offers
of even partial compensation.
219. "Subjects" includes citizens, as assumed by the 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, throughout, and
permanent residents. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d 27, 28. The term may or may not embrace transient or
illegal aliens.
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the jurisdiction of the United States; 20 under conflict-of-laws principles,
the United States thus has some obligation to provide a forum.2  But
Congress has acted to eliminate the forum formerly provided by the com-
mon law;222 the government of the United States, not general principles of
law, denies the "day in court" that is so important to due process. Al-
though this does not necessarily mean the IOIA is unconstitutional,223 it
does urge that the United States government provide compensation for this
deprivation.
Also, Congress may not accept, or the courts may reject, such a re-
stricted jurisdictional immunity. If Congress decided to adopt such an im-
munity, the process of enacting the necessary legislation might consume
many years; 22 moreover, the courts generally have been unwilling to deal
with matters involving foreign affairs,2 '5 even when Congress has explic-
itly conferred such jurisdiction on them.2 6 Retention of absolute immunity
under the IOIA would present a stronger case for providing legal redress
of some kind.
Since the United States government presumably granted immunity to
IGOs on the basis that such immunity gained more for its citizens as a
whole than it cost them, 227 substitution of that government when an IGO
defendant is immune is a fair solution.228 France, for example, has already
employed such a device to protect its nationals in ordinary tort actions. 2 19
220. The United States having no jurisdiction over defendant IGOs as such, it can assert jurisdic-
tion only on the basis of a plaintiff's ties to it or of events occurring within its boundaries. See, e.g.,
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930); Lashbrooke, Vertical Integration and Restraints by
the Oil-Producing Countries: Antitrust Implications and Supply Considerations, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POLITICS 193, 195-97 (1980). Even the far-reaching "effects" test depends upon the action's
having effects within United States territory. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18, Reporters' Note 2 (1965).
221. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951) (state must provide forum when, inter
alia, parties residents in it); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (same when defendant
incorporated in state).
222. IGOs had no immunity in American law before enactment of the IOIA; immunity had in
fact been refused on the ground that no statute provided for it. See supra p. 1168. Domestic and
foreign sovereigns, on the other hand, derived their immunity from general principles of common law.
See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 135-36; supra pp. 1168, 1172-73, 1185.
223. As indicated earlier, IGOs are, for example, composed of governments possessing common-
law immunity.
224. For example, drafting began on the FSIA, enacted in 1976, in the mid-1960's. 1976 REPORT,
supra note 6, at 9.
225. See supra pp. 1184-85.
226. See, e.g., Note, Carey v. National Oil Co.: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Embar-
goed, 42 U. PITrS. L. REV. 149 (1980).
227. See supra note 33. Domestic sovereign immunity law now accepts the principle that a single
citizen should not bear the cost of an activity that benefits the entire community. E.g., Ayala v. Phila-
delphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 593-94, 305 A.2d 877, 884 (1973).
228. Cf Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 1167-69,
1171-72 (1954) (proposing such substitution for immune foreign sovereign).
229. See Fortune Insurance Co. v. Etat Francais, 1964 Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de cassa-
tion, chambres civiles, section civile 248, 45 I.L.R. 462 (1972); CODE CIVILE art. 1384, s. 1; N.A.T.O.
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Congress could easily enact appropriate legislation, under a theory of in-
ternational immunity acceptable to it; or, since the United States is by
definition a participant in the entity being sued, the courts could hold it
liable under partner or joint venturer theories. 20
Such a solution would further the interests of private parties dealing
with IGOs; if the IGO were immune, the United States government
would remain secondarily liable when not itself immune as the domestic
sovereign.2 ' The nation's interests would not be materially harmed, for
the relevant IGO activities are insignificant compared to those of the
United States government itself; and, in any case, Congress has the power
to control the extent of domestic sovereign liability. The same reasons
make it unlikely that IGOs would suffer through the efforts of the United
States to control their activities or unnecessarily to restrict their immu-
nity, 1 especially since the United States benefits both independently and
as a member from the IGO's operations and immunity. 33
Even when the United States government was immune, plaintiffs' abil-
ity to recover by petitioning Congress would be enhanced. Asserting the
secondary liability of the United States converts a potentially complex in-
AGREEMENT art. 8, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
230. IGOs possess juristic personality, and thus are separate from their members. Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 173; Seyersted, International Per-
sonality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 4 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1964). The chief reason, how-
ever, for limiting the liability of shareholders for corporate debts is to encourage the rapid growth of
commercial investment and enterprise by combining unlimited opportunity for profit with limited
possible loss. But nations become members of IGOs for public rather than profit-oriented purposes;
and, being sovereign states, they are able to specify the extent of their own immunity from suit.
Hence, this rationale does not apply.
An IGO could, then, be treated as a partnership, which possesses no juristic personality, e.g.,
Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1937) (L. Hand, J.). Thus, each partner is personally
liable for the debts of the partnership. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914); see also 1 G. HORN-
STEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 3 (1959); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 30 (2d
ed. 1979).
Alternatively, because of the limited or specific purposes of most IGOs, they could be treated as
joint ventures. See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 10 (2d ed. 1971); see also, e.g., A. BROM-
BERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 189 (1968). Members of joint ventures are liable as
partners. N. LATTIN, supra, at 10-11; A. BROMBERG, supra, at 193; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 79 (1970).
Under either theory, then, a member of an IGO may be held secondarily liable for debts of the
organization, subject to the provisions of the member's immunity law.
231. The United States government has waived its immunity in many situations. See supra p.
1186.
232. Past practice suggests that the United States will use even a right of subrogation only reluc-
tantly. For example, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) had decided not to seek
compensation from the Jamaican government, which had allegedly caused the loss for which OPIC
was sued as guarantor, before arbitration of a dispule between a private investor and OPIC, even
though damages could have run to $60-80,000,000. Conversation with E. Donald Elliott, attorney for
OPIC in that case, Mar. 17, 1981; see Revere Copper & Brass v. Overseas Private Investment Corp.,
O.P.I.C. Case No. 16 10 0137 76, Aug. 24, 1978, afI'd, Misc. No. 78-0296 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 1978),
ald, 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
233. 1945 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 947 (quoted supra note 33); 1945 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 2 (same).
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ternational question into a relatively straightforward issue of domestic
politics. 134
Conclusion
This Note has attempted to resolve two questions presented by
Broadbent v. OAS: 235 whether the FSIA is to be read directly into the
IOIA; and to what extent IGOs are to be immune under the IOIA from
the jurisdiction of United States courts. It has also attempted to provide a
means of redress for injured private persons in cases in which an IGO
defendant is immune.
The IOIA and the FSIA are independent statutes. Nonetheless, using
Broadbenes implicit model of IGOs as government agencies rather than
governments led to a theory of restricted IGO immunity. IGOs would be
immune with respect to their core activities but no others-a rule to be
tested by the functional immunity principle.
That rule leaves IGOs immune in at least some cases. To minimize
injury to private persons, the United States government should be substi-
tuted as defendant under a partner or joint venturer theory.
234. Cf supra pp. 1184-85 (discussing political character of international as opposed to domestic
suits).
235. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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